



Identity Authentication





Face Verification

Fingerprint Verification

User interaction







Smartphone

Laptop

Medical record





Medical electronic patient record system

Privacy in Al





- The success of AI systems heavily relies on data that might contain private and sensitive information.
- Can we still take the advantages of data while effectively protecting the privacy?











Machine Learning in Al



A typical pipeline

Privacy Leakage in Al









Data & model

□ Black-box & white-box setting

Training & test phase

□ Honest-but-curious & fully malicious







Privacy Leakage in Al



Membership Inference



To identify whether a data record is used in the training of model



Shokri, Reza, et al. "Membership inference attacks against machine learning models." 2017.

Data Sharing



User's data are collected and shared in the data center to train AI systems



Gradient Leakage



Distributed learning over mobile devices by synchronizing/sharing gradients



ML models

- Text autocorrection
- Next word prediction
- Word completion

Local computation

Gradient Leakage (Continued)



Steal training data from the gradient information in distributed learning



Zhu, Ligeng, and Song Han. "Deep leakage from gradients." 2020.

Gradient Leakage (Continued)



Steal training data from the gradient information in distributed learning



Zhu, Ligeng, and Song Han. "Deep leakage from gradients." 2020.

Model Inversion



To infer the information of the input data using the model's output



Recover the face image given the person's name and the class confidence of a facial recognition system

Model Extraction



To extract the model information by querying the model in a black-box setting







Privacy Preservation in Al







Differential Privacy

It aims to reduce the disclosure about individual information in a dataset

 \Box A randomized algorithm A is (ε, δ) -differentially private if for all $S \in \text{Range}(A)$ and for all adjacent datasets D and D' such that

 $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in \mathcal{S}] \le e^{\epsilon} \Pr(\mathcal{A}(D') \in \mathcal{S}) + \delta$

 \Box If (ϵ,δ) are sufficiently small, the output of the algorithm A will be almost identical

 $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D) \in \mathcal{S}] \approx \Pr(\mathcal{A}(D') \in \mathcal{S})$

Differential Privacy



- Random response
- Gaussian mechanism
- Laplace mechanism

Exponential mechanism

- Flip a coin
- If tails, then respond truthfully.
- If heads, then flip a second coin and respond "Yes" if heads and "No" if tails

Federated Learning



Clients collaboratively train a model while keeping the data decentralized



Kairouz, Peter, et al. "Advances and open problems in federated learning." (2019).

Workflow of Federated Learning





Confidential Computing



□ Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

• Isolating data and programs by software and hardware techniques

□ Homomorphic Encryption

• Computing functions on ciphertext without decryption

□ Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC)

• Jointly performing function computations on private data

Secure Multi-party Computation



Federated Learning with Secure Aggregation



Bonawitz, Keith, et al. "Practical secure aggregation for federated learning on user-held data." 2016. Bonawitz, Keith, et al. "Practical secure aggregation for privacy-preserving machine learning." 2017.





Deep Learning



Differentially private SGD

Input: Examples $\{x_1, \ldots, x_N\}$, loss function $\mathcal{L}(\theta) =$
$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i}\mathcal{L}(\theta, x_{i})$. Parameters: learning rate η_{t} , noise scale
σ , group size L, gradient norm bound C.
Initialize θ_0 randomly
$\mathbf{for}t\in[T]\mathbf{do}$
Take a random sample L_t with sampling probability
L/N
Compute gradient
For each $i \in L_t$, compute $\mathbf{g}_t(x_i) \leftarrow \nabla_{\theta_t} \mathcal{L}(\theta_t, x_i)$
Clip gradient
$ar{\mathbf{g}}_t(x_i) \leftarrow \mathbf{g}_t(x_i) / \max\left(1, \frac{\ \mathbf{g}_t(x_i)\ _2}{C}\right)$
Add noise
$ ilde{\mathbf{g}}_t \leftarrow rac{1}{L} \left(\sum_i ar{\mathbf{g}}_t(x_i) + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 C^2 \mathbf{I}) ight)$
Descent
$ heta_{t+1} \leftarrow heta_t - \eta_t ilde{\mathbf{g}}_t$
Output θ_T and compute the overall privacy cost (ε, δ)
using a privacy accounting method.

Add Gaussian noise into gradient

Biometric Data Analysis





Differentially private facial recognition

Chamikara, Mahawaga, et al. "Privacy preserving face recognition utilizing differential privacy." 2020.

Drug development





Host OS



Medical imaging









Surveys

General concepts

- Al-Rubaie, Mohammad, and J. Morris Chang. "Privacy-preserving machine learning: Threats and solutions." 2019
- De Cristofaro, Emiliano. "An overview of privacy in machine learning." 2020
- Rigaki, Maria, and Sebastian Garcia. "A survey of privacy attacks in machine learning." 2020

Differential privacy

- Dwork, Cynthia. "Differential privacy: A survey of results." 2008
- Dwork, Cynthia, and Aaron Roth. "The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy." 2014
- Ji, Zhanglong, Zachary C. Lipton, and Charles Elkan. "Differential privacy and machine learning: a survey and review." 2014

Federated Learning

- Kairouz, Peter, et al. "Advances and open problems in federated learning." 2019
- Yang, Qiang, et al. "Federated machine learning: Concept and applications." 2019

Tools



Differential Privacy

- TensorFlow Privacy
- Opacus
- OpenDP
- Diffpriv

□ Federated Learning

- TensorFlow Federated (TFF)
- Paddle Federated Learning
- FATE
- FedML
- LEAF

Confidential Computing

- Keystone Enclave
- Google's FHE Repository
- IBM FHE toolkit
- AWS HE toolkit
- SHEEP
- CBMC-GC
- Conclave
- CipherCompute
- MPC-SoK
- HyCC
- UC Compiler

Future Directions



- Uncovering more sources of potential privacy leakage in AI systems
- Improving the performance of federated learning in heterogeneous environments
- **D** Exploiting a better trade-off between utility and privacy loss in DP
- Improving the computation efficiency and flexibility of confidential computing
- Integrated systems and solutions